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INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS: A
REASSESSMENT
Bernard E. Epton* and Roger A. Bixby**
In 1971 the Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Insurance
Guaranty Fund to protect the policyholders of casualty insur-
ance companies in the event their insurer became insolvent.
Similar laws have been enacted in 47 states. This Article dis-
cusses various provisions of casualty guaranty funds which pre-
vent policyholders from receiving complete insolvency protec-
tion. In addition, the Article examines the Model Life and
Health Guaranty Association Bill promulgated by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners and suggests that such
legislation be enacted with several changes. The Article also
analyzes a few of the proposals which have been offered for
financing guaranty funds. Finally, the authors conclude that the
guaranty fund legislation enacted heretofore has received insuf-
ficient evaluation in terms of the overall goals of insurance regu-
lation.
It has been a little over fifteen years since the first comprehen-
sive analysis of insurance company insolvencies was concluded.,
Since that time supplemental studies have been undertaken2 and
* Illinois State Representative; Chairman, Illinois Insurance Laws Study Commission;
Partner, Epton & Druth, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois.
** Administrative Assistant to the Illinois Insurance Laws Study Commission; J.D.
1974, University of Chicago.
1. H. Bishara, An Analysis of Insurance Company Financial Insolvencies and the Public
Interest, 1961 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in the University of Wisconsin Library).
2. See, e.g., Bennett, Liquidation of Insurance Companies: Part A, in INSURANCE AND
GOVERNMENT 191 (C. Center & R. Heins eds. 1962); Heins, Liquidation of Insurance Com-
panies: Part B, in INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT 282 (C. Center & R. Heins eds. 1962);
Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
Hearings]; Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 Hearings]; D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AuToMOBILE INSURERS: ADVISORY RE-
PORT TO THE DIVISION OF INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (1970); D. Olson, Insolvencies Among
High-Risk.Automobile Insurance Companies, 1969 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in
University of Pennsylvania Library). A partial list of other materials is contained in 1
Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 52 (1963)
(hereinafter cited as Proceedings of the NAIC].
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various solutions have been proposed3 and adopted.' The most
important of the solutions to the problem of insurer insolvencies
has been the creation of guaranty funds which are intended to
protect policyholders and injured third parties regardless of the
financial condition of the company which issued the policy. Be-
cause the preponderance of insolvencies which have occurred
within the last fifteen years have involved "high risk" automobile
insurers, the guaranty fund legislation enacted to date has fo-
cused on property and casualty insurance.'
Prior to 1969, only a few states had enacted guaranty fund
legislation. New York for many years had had guaranty funds
covering workmen's compensation,6 public motor vehicles,7 pri-
vate motor vehicles,8 and life insurance.9 In addition, Maryland'"
and New Jersey" had enacted motor vehicle guaranty fund legis-
3. The proposed solutions include expanding the uninsured motorist endorsement to
include protection against insurer insolvency; creation of unsatisfied judgment funds,
state guaranty funds, and federal guaranty funds; higher capital requirements for insur-
ance companies; and stricter regulatory supervision.
4. Insolvency coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement expanded rapidly in
the 1960's, at least in part through legislative and industry reaction to Senator Dodd's
proposal for a Federal Motor Vehicle Insurance Guaranty Corporation. See 2 Proceedings
of the NAIC 599 (1967). In 1967 Illinois mandated the purchase of uninsured motorist
coverage and defined "uninsured" to include claims against subsequently insolvent insur-
ers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a(2) (1973). For cases arising under the uninsured motorist
endorsement before July 1, 1967, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that insolvency
constituted a denial of coverage by the tortfeasor's insurer within the provisions of the
endorsement and that coverage should therefore be provided. Kaszeski v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 54 Ill.2d 241, 296 N.E.2d 743 (1973). However, if the endorsement did not provide
for coverage upon the denial of coverage by the tortfeasor's insurer, the victim could not
recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement. Dreher v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 83
Ill.App.2d 141, 226 N.E.2d 287 (2d Dist. 1967).
As of September 1, 1974, guaranty fund legislation covering virtually all property and
casualty lines had been enacted in 47 states and the District of Columbia. The only states
which did not have a guaranty fund on that date were Alabama, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.
See Supplement to Letter of the National Committee on Insurance Guaranty Funds, Oct.
9, 1974 [hereinafter cited as NCIGF Letter].
5. See NAIC State Post-Assessment Insurance Guaranty Association Model Bill § 3, 1
Proceedings of the NAIC 253 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Model Casualty Bill]. See also
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.83 (1973).
6. N.Y. WORKMAN'S CoMp. LAW §§ 107-109 (d) (McKinney 1965).
7. N.Y. INS. LAW § 330 (McKinney 1966).
8. N.Y. INS. LAW § 334 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
9. N.Y. INS. LAW § 224 (McKinney 1966).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482A (1957).
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-92 to 104 (1961).
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lation and several other states had created workmen's compensa-
tion funds.'" All these funds tended to be limited in scope.'3 Pres-
ent guaranty funds, although much broader in scope, still do not
fully protect policyholders.
While guaranty fund legislation is no exception to the general
rule that insurance statutes are conceived on an ad hoc basis, 4
many of the gaps in guaranty fund legislation are a direct result
of the insurance industry's reluctance to embrace the concept. A
primary objection to guaranty funds has been that they create a
disincentive for the vigilant supervision of the insurance industry
by regulatory officials. 5 Yet in continually harping upon the need
for more stringent regulation for insolvency"6 the insurance indus-
try has ignored the historical failure of regulators to prevent insol-
vencies. Even more importantly, the industry, and some regula-
tors,'7 seem to forget that company solvency is not an ultimate
goal of insurance regulation.'" Rather, as Professor Patterson
noted in his comprehensive study of insurance regulation, "The
chief object in view in creating separate insurance departments
and in delegating to them extensive powers of regulation and
investigation was to protect the public against financially un-
12. See generally 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 45 (1962).
13. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 32.
14. S. Kimball & H. Denenberg, Problems of Comprehensive Insurance Revision
Programs, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 44 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg
eds. 1969).
15. See generally 1 Proceedings of NAIC 43 passim (1962); 1 Proceedings of the NAIC
176 (1971); Note, Insurance Company Insolvencies: Relief for Victims in Illinois, 15
DEPAUL L. REV. 170,174 (1965).
16. See Trieschmann & Pinches, A Multivariate Model for Predicting Financially
Distressed P-L Insurers, 40 J. RISK & INS. 327 (1973).
17. See text accompanying note 80 infra.
18. Cf. Kimball, The Goals of Insurance Law: Means Versus Ends, 1962 J. INS. 19.
Professor Kimball perceptively observed that:
If insurance is to do its job - i.e. if it is to insure - then the insurance
enterprise, both in the aggregate and company by company, must be secure and
solvent. Solvency is the most important goal of all insurance law and regulation,
though it is not always given effect by individual courts or insurance commis-
sioners. But the goal sought is not solvency in the technical sense, or more
accurately, technical solvency is not enough to satisfy the needs of the going
insurance institution. There must be a degree and type of solvency that ensures
that the policyholder will continue to be protected in any reasonably foreseeable
situation. The enterprise must be more than solvent, it must be solid.
Id. at 21.
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sound enterprises. . . . "' In short, unless solvency regulation
can be made perfect,20 other solutions are necessary to ensure that
the policyholder is secure. In light of this ultimate goal of insur-
ance regulation, guaranty funds appear to offer the best means
of providing complete protection to the policyholder.
The industry's begrudging acceptance of guaranty fund legisla-
tion in 1969 was prompted in large part by the threat of substan-
tial federal intervention in insurance regulation as envisioned by
the proposal for a federal insurance guaranty corporation.2 Al-
though Senator Thomas Dodd had introduced similar legislation
before 1969,2 the 1969 bill was assigned to the Senate Committee
on Commerce which eventually reported it out with a favorable
recommendation.23 An indication of the substantiality of the fed-
eral threat as perceived by insurance companies can be found by
comparing the public statement of the American Mutual Insur-
ance Alliance (AMIA), a major industry trade association,
strongly opposing any form of guaranty fund as of May 6, 19694
with its vigorous support for state post-insolvency assessment
guaranty funds as of November 12, 1969.3 A further indication is
that as of February 24, 1972, forty-five states had enacted guar-
anty fund legislation covering over ninety percent of the property-
casualty premium volume nationwide." Thus, excluding the ex-
isting funds in New York, Maryland, and New Jersey forty-two
states had rushed to enact guaranty fund legislation in a little less
than three years.
19. 1 E. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 192 (Harvard Studies in Administrative Law reprinted
1968) (emphasis added).
20. Some commentators have even suggested that complete solvency protection for
each company, as compared to each policyholder, may be undesirable. See N.Y. Ins.
Dept., Regulation of Financial Condition of Insurance Companies, 95 n.114, 96 nn.115 &
116 (1974).
21. S. 2236, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
22. S. 3919, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 688, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
23. S. Rep. No. 91-1421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
24. Statement of the American Mutual Insurance Alliance (AMIA) submitted for the
Record. Hearings on S. 2236 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 91-26, at 45-61 (1969).
25. Testimony of Andre Masionpierre, Vice President of AMIA, Hearings on S. 2236
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-45, at 70-71 (1969).
See also 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 271 (1970).
26. NCIGF Letter, Feb. 24, 1972, at 1.
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The place of Illinois in these events is both prominent and
ignominious. The hearings on the insurance industry conducted
by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee27 disclosed
that Illinois had more insolvencies in the period between 1958 and
1968 than any other state." Furthermore, despite the assuasive
statements of public officials, 9 the measures which were enacted
by the Illinois legislature provided less than complete protection
for policyholders. 0 Finally, in 1971 because of the threat of federal
intervention and continued uncertainty regarding the solvency of
several insurers,3' guaranty fund legislation was enacted in Illi-
nois.3"
Since the initial rush to establish post-insolvency guaranty
funds at the state level there has been only one substantial at-
tempt to re-examine the purposes of guaranty fund legislation
and the relationship of such legislation to other insurance laws,
especially those concerning the rehabilitation and liquidation of
companies.33 Moreover, although guaranty funds have been the
27. 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8968.
28. Id. This fact was also disclosed in the Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-26, at 6 (1969).
29. 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 6753-76 (testimony of John F. Bolton, Jr., Director
of Insurance, State of Illinois). See also Bolton, The Illinois Program: A Two Year Plan
to Modernize Regulation of the Insurance Industry, 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 355-62
(1967).
30. Among the bills included in the Department of Insurance's package of legislation
for 1967 was a bill to create a Motor Vehicle Liability Security Fund. S.B. 122, 75th Ill.
Gen. Assembly (1967) (Introduced January 8, 1967). The bill was not passed however;
instead, legislation was enacted which required that uninsured motorist coverage be in-
cluded in any bodily injury liability automobile insurance policy. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 755a (1973). See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8967.
31. For example, the Freedom Insurance Company was placed in liquidation on March
31, 1970; the Fidelity General Insurance Company was placed in liquidation on December
4, 1970; the LaSalle National Insurance Company was placed in liquidation on December
28, 1971. See 1973 Ill. Dept. Ins. Ann. Rep. 47-49.
32. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.82-.03 (1973).
33. The best discussion of guaranty funds and their effect on other aspects of insurance
regulation is found in N.Y. Ins. Dep't Regulation of Financial Condition of Insurance
Companies (1974). Prior to the enactment of most guaranty fund laws, Professor Douglas
Olson set forth several criteria for guaranty fund legislation and speculated on a few of
the possible consequences of such legislation as part of a study of automobile insurer
insolvency. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 31.
In addition, the insurance industry has established the National Committee on Insur-
ance Guaranty Funds. The Committee monitors developments in the various states, main-
tains extensive materials on guaranty funds, and serves as a clearinghouse for information
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subject of recent articles in insurance literature, no attempt has
been made to examine them from the policyholder's viewpoint.34
It is the purpose of this article to reassess several sections of the
Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund Act35 to determine if policy-
holders are adequately protected and, if not, what changes should
be made in the Illinois laws. In addition, because of their relev-
ance to the issue of policyholder safety, provisions of the NAIC
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act,3"
unique provisions of other state guaranty fund laws, and other
proposals for amending guaranty funds will also be examined to
see if they meet the elusive goal of securing the "protection of the
insured."37
DEDUCTIBLE PROVISIONS
Loss Claims
The Illinois guaranty fund,38 the NAIC Model Act,39 and most
other guaranty fund laws40 contain provisions for a deductible,
on guaranty funds. Although the NCIGF has not published a comprehensive study of
guaranty fund legislation, it is an excellent source of information regarding specific provi-
sions of property and casualty guaranty funds.
The newly found interest of insurance companies in actively participating with state
insurance departments in regulating for solvency, particularly with regard to recent
NCIGF proposals to modify provisions of both guaranty fund and liquidation laws, is
probably a consequence of the fact that most property-liability guaranty funds require
companies, and thus indirectly their policyholders, to have a direct stake in the solvency
of other companies. As will be discussed, this may be a forceful reason for not incorporat-
ing a tax offset provision within guaranty fund legislation. See text accompanying notes
119-36 infra.
34. See, e.g., Harrison, Insurance Companies Insolvencies, Guaranty Funds and Bro-
ker's Responsibilities, 1975 INS. L.J. 517 [hereinafter cited as Harrison]; Korsan, Guar-
anty Funds: Trapeze or Trap? 1975 J. INS. 8.
35. ILL. REV. STAT., ch.73, §§ 1065.82-.103 (1973).
36. 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 160-73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Model Life Bill].
37. Kimball, supra note 18, at 20.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973).
39. Model Casualty Bill § 8, supra note 5, at 255.
40. As of January 1, 1975 only Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont did not impose a deductible on any
claims other than workmen's compensation claims. Arizona imposes a $200 deductible on
all claims except those for unearned premiums. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-664 (A) (1)
(Supp., 1974). Note that the Arizona Guaranty Fund Association has recently been de-
clared unconstitutional. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Arizona Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 112 Ariz.
7, 536 P. 2d 695 (1975). The Supreme Court of Arizona found that the act establishing
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typically $100 or $200. This deductible is to be distinguished from
that which is ordinarily included in the standard automobile in-
surance policy for collision and comprehensive coverages. The
deductible in the Guaranty Fund Act applies to the amount the
insolvent insurer is obligated to pay to the insured and is distinct
from a policy provision deductible which applies against the total
loss incurred.4' Originally, the use of deductible provisions in
guaranty funds may have resulted from relying on similar provi-
sions in existing statutes." Alternatively, deductible provisions
may have been adopted because similar provisions were common-
place in automobile physical damages coverages.43 In any event,
deductible provisions were incorporated in the NAIC Model Bill"
and the Illinois Guaranty Fund Law.4"
Upon review, the inclusion of a deductible provision for claims
within the context of a guaranty fund appears objectionable on
many grounds." First, the use of a deductible for claims, exclud-
the association violated the Arizona Constitution, art. 14, § 2 which states: "Corporations
may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special Acts ....
House Bill 1739 (Epton) was recently passed by the Illinois General Assembly. P.A. No.
79-1011 (Sept. 17, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973). The Act
eliminates the $100 deductible applicable to all claims except unearned premiums and
expands coverage from $50,000 to $100,000. The bill originally eliminated both the deduct-
ible and ceiling applicable to all claims, but was amended to accommodate spokesmen
for both the insurance industry and the Illinois Department of Insurance, and to ensure
passage.
41. For example, a policyholder with a $500 loss and a $100 deductible policy provision
would normally collect $400 from his insurer. If the insurer is insolvent, the policyholder
would collect only $300, plus any unearned premium, from the guaranty fund because of
the application of the guaranty fund deductible. The New Jersey statutes specify that the
guaranty fund deductible is separate from the deductible contained in the policy. N.J.
REV. STAT. § 17:30A-8 (Supp., 1975).
42. In an informal conversation between one of the authors and the Staff Director of
the Insurance Laws Revision Committee of Wisconsin, it was suggested that this was
probably the case in that state. Prior to the enactment of the Wisconsin Insurance Secu-
rity Fund, an elaborate revision of the rehabilitation and liquidation laws of that state
had been made which included a $200 deductible for loss claims. A $200 deductible was
also made applicable to security fund coverage. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 646.11 (3) (Special
Supp., 1975).
43. Cf. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 38.
44. The Comment to section 8 of the NAIC bill provides the unenlightening information
that "The deductible amount ($100) and the maximum ($300,000) represent the subcom-
mittee's concept of practical limitations." Model Casualty Bill § 8, Comment, supra note
5, at 256.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973).
46. These comments are based in large part upon a prior article of one of the authors.
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ing claims for refund of unearned premiums, is an inequitable
means of reducing the contribution required from a guaranty
fund in the case of an insolvency. In the absence of a guaranty
fund statute, deductibles have the salutory effect of increasing
the proportion of the assets of an insolvent insurer which are
available for distribution in liquidation to persons with larger
losses." However, with the presence of a guaranty fund, the pri-
mary effect of a guaranty fund deductible provision is to reduce
the liability of the guaranty fund for covered claims; it does not
affect the amount of claims in liquidation and, hence, does not
increase the proportion of assets which can be utilized to compen-
sate those persons with large claims. Instead, a guaranty fund
deductible merely reduces the amount of the assessments made
upon solvent insurance companies.
It is also important to note that the deductible provision as
applied to claims does not affect all policyholders of the insolvent
company. A deductible provision applied against loss claims only
hurts those who have had the misfortune to be involved in an
accident while insured by the insolvent insurer. Thus, a guaranty
fund deductible provision has the untoward result of arbitrarily
selecting a small group of policyholders who are likely to be least
able to suffer the cost of an insolvency, and requires them to bear
an extra burden in liquidation in order that the assessments lev-
ied against solvent insurance companies by the guaranty fund
will not be so great. Because the fundamental purpose of guar-
anty fund legislation is to shift the burden of an insolvency from
a limited group of policyholders to a larger group of policyholders,
it makes little sense to have a provision that shifts some of the
burden of an insolvency back onto the very policyholders who
have suffered the greatest loss. Moreover, even if the deductible
can be viewed as a means of creating an incentive for policyhol-
ders to carefully select insurers,48 its application to loss claims is
See Epton, Deductible Provision - Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, ILL. INS., Mar.-April,
1974, at 2.
47. In liquidation a deductible reduces the total amount of claims against the remaining
assets. More importantly, since a deductible has its greatest impact on small claims, the
claims remaining after the application of a deductible are the larger ones-the very events
in which there is the greatest need for insurance.
48. See KROGH, INSURER POSTINSOLVENCY GUARANTY FUNDS 51-52, Appendix B (Working
Paper No. 55, University of Kansas School of Business 1971), and authorities cited in note
118, infra.
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still inequitable. All the policyholders of the insolvent insurer
have made the same mistake, yet only those with loss claims will
be penalized for their actions through the application of a loss
claims deductible.
This point has generally been overlooked by commentators
with the result that the only support for eliminating the deducti-
ble provision has come from agents or brokers who have a strong
self-interest in minimizing the effects of an insolvency on their
clients, especially independent agents and brokers who have
placed a policy with a company which subsequently becomes
insolvent,4" or from persons who object to the deductible provision
because it has in the past most often affected policyholders who
were least able to bear the additional burden. While these argu-
ments are of some merit, the best reason for objecting to loss
deductible provisions is that they are an inequitable means of
distributing the cost of an insolvency within the framework of
guaranty fund legislation. There is no valid reason to use deducti-
bles for loss claims when the specious savings that result really
involve determining whether a small or large group of policyhold-
ers should shoulder the cost of an insolvency.
Unearned Premiums"°
The application of a deductible to unearned premiums presents
a different and much more complex problem than that of loss
claims deductibles.5' Opinions about whether to include un-
49. See, e.g., Report submitted by Ralph A. Petrarca, Spokesman for the National
Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 318 (1971). His report
focuses on the attempts to eliminate unearned premiums from inclusion within the provi-
sions of guaranty fund legislation and only in passing advocates full protection for policy-
holders. See also Harrison, supra note 34, at 517.
50. Insurance policies are typically not purchased on an installment basis. While the
premium payment may be financed by a third party, the entire premium is usually due
to the insurer when the policy commences. The prepaid portion of the premium at any
point in time is known as the unearned premium.
51. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 34-35. Un-
earned premiums are not covered at all in California, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Lim-
itations on the amounts of unearned premiums considered to be covered are found in
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-278 (1) (a) (i) (Supp., 1975), (50% of unearned
premiums with a $1,000 limit); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-6-8-7 (a)(i) (1975), ($500);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-4004 (4) (Supp., 1974), ($500); and Texas, TEX. INS.
CODE art. 21.28-C, § 5 (2) (Supp., 1974) ($500).
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earned premiums in property-casualty guaranty funds usually
reflect one of two positions. One, the unearned premium is de-
clared to be a cost of insolvency to the policyholder which should
be covered in full.5" Two, it is said that including unearned prem-
iums within the scope of guaranty funds should not be permitted
because it will remove an incentive for policyholders to select a
company with care. A third possible position might be that the
unearned premium claim should be considered a part of the eco-
nomic cost of an insolvency, but that it deserves a lower priority."
Of these three positions, the last is by far the most supportable
because the insurance premium represents the amount of money
the policyholder was willing to pay in order that he might be
protected against the possibility of a much larger loss. In other
words, an insurance premium is an acceptable loss. This distinc-
tion between premium losses and claim losses is crudely reflected
in the Illinois guaranty fund provision which applies a deductible
to unearned premiums but not to other claims.54 Nevertheless,
none of these positions adequately analyzes the appropriateness
of deductibles for unearned premiums within the framework of
guaranty fund legislation.
A prime objection to post-insolvency guaranty funds has been
the allegation that such funds subsidize mismanaged companies
at the expense of well-managed ones.5 While this argument has
been properly rejected insofar as it applies to incentives for man-
agement to knowingly cause their company to become insolvent,56
it retains an element of truth. For instance, assume that a guar-
anty fund has unlimited coverage and contains no deductibles for
claims or unearned premiums.57 In that situation the only eco-
nomic loss a policyholder would suffer upon insolvency would be
52. N.Y. Ins. Dep't., Regulation of Financial Condition of Insurance Companies, supra
note 20, at 93 n. 109 (1974).
53. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 645.68 (4), Comment (Special Supp., 1975). The Comment
applied to liquidations but appears to be equally valid with regard to guaranty funds.
54. P. A. 79-1011 (Sept. 17, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973).
55. See 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 677 (1969); 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 178 (1971).
56. 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 1101 (1970). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 646, Comment
(Special Supp., 1975).
57. This statement assumes no other gaps in insolvency coverage. The cost of an insol-
vency may be quite great to a person who incurs a loss after the liquidation order is
entered, or whose claim is in excess of any guaranty fund ceiling, or who otherwise suffers
because of a gap in the coverage of guaranty funds.
[Vol. 25:227
INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS
the value of any extra delay in receiving compensation for claims
from the administrator in liquidation or the guaranty fund, and
any costs associated with unexpectedly having to obtain new cov-
erage. While these costs in a particular case may be quite sub-
stantial, they nevertheless appear quite speculative. Thus, with-
out some sort of a deductible provision, only the policyholders
of solvent insurers under a post-insolvency fund will ultimately
bear the cost of any assessment which occurs. Because guaranty
funds constitute a unique form of reinsurance," it does not appear
unreasonable to suggest that the insureds of an insolvent insurer
be charged their proportionate share of the cost of such reinsur-
ance. However, the implementation of such a provision might
unnecessarily complicate and delay guaranty fund or liquidation
proceedings.59 Hence, a small deductible applied against the un-
earned premium account appears to be the simplest means by
which to apportion a charge for insolvency protection among in-
solvent insureds roughly equivalent to that which will fall on the
policyholders of all solvent insurers.'"
Although some deductible for unearned premiums seems ap-
propriate, deductibles of $100 or more appear excessive." A de-
ductible of perhaps $1 to $5 applied only against unearned pre-
mium claims would be fairer, although it would probably still be
58. Reinsurance has been defined as "[a] type of insurance that involves acceptance
by an insurer, called a reinsurer, of all or a part of the risk of loss of another insurer, known
as the ceding company." GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 134 (R. Osler & J. Bickley eds.
1972). Because the guaranty fund assumes the risk of one eventuality, insolvency, it can
be considered a reinsurer. Cf. Kobler, Guaranty Funds-A Form of Re-Reinsurance, Best's
REVIEW (Property/Liability ed., Nov. 1973) at 10.
59. The final precise assessment might not be determined for many years. Moreover,
although most policyholders probably have unearned premium claims, some policyholders
might not have sufficient amounts of unearned premiums to cover their assessment. In
these instances expensive collection proceedings would be necessary.
60. The authors acknowledge that this form of assessment will not be entirely satisfac-
tory. However, since most policyholders of the insolvent insurer will have an unearned
premium claim, the application of a deductible against such claims will achieve reasona-
ble equity.
61. As a crude test, the authors compared the premiums earned in Illinois in one year
by the top ten property and casualty companies, approximately $810,000,000 in 1973, with
the total assessments projected to be made by the Illinois guaranty fund throughout its
entire existence, approximately $10,800,000 as of March 1, 1975. Such a calculation yields
total projected assessments equal to 1.3% of the premiums written by the top ten compa-
nies in 1973. See also Harrison, supra note 34, at 520.
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too large when considered alone. However, because a guaranty
fund should also provide for a continuation of insurance coverage
for a reasonable time after the date of an order of liquidation, a
somewhat larger deductible may be appropriate. If stopgap
coverage is provided which will allow the policyholder a reason-
able amount of time to purchase alternative coverage, a deduc-
tible of perhaps $25 to $50 could be justified as an appropriate
charge for both insolvency "reinsurance" and limited post-
insolvency insurance coverage.2
THIRTY DAY POST-LIQUIDATION COVERAGE
One of the salutory provisions of the Wisconsin rehabilitation
and liquidation law is the provision that claims for injuries arising
within fifteen days after an order of liquidation has been entered
will be covered within the liquidation proceedings. 3 Such a provi-
sion takes cognizance of the fact that it is unrealistic to expect
an insured to be able to purchase, or even be aware of the need
for, alternative insurance coverage upon the filing of an order of
liquidation. A similar provision permitting stopgap coverage for
thirty days was included in the NAIC Model Bill 4 and was in-
tended to be included in the Illinois law. 5
Unfortunately, the legislation establishing the Illinois guaranty
fund was amended so that temporary post-insolvency insurance
coverage is probably not mandated by law. The Illinois definition
of a covered claim differs from the NAIC version in that in Illinois
a policy must be "in force at the time of the occurrence giving rise
to the unpaid claim.""6 Illinois has no statutory provision which
explicitly states that policies shall continue "in force" after an
62. Although the discussion herein has distinguished between unearned premium
claims and other policyholder claims, the application of a single deductible to all policy-
holder claims is probably more practicable if both unearned premiums and loss claims
are fully covered.
63. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 645.43 (Special Supp., 1975). The section provides that coverage
will continue for the lesser of: (a) fifteen days from the entry of the liquidation order: (b)
until the policy normally terminates: (c) until the policy has been transferred to a solvent
insurer: or (d) until the policy has been replaced.
64. Model Casualty Bill § 8, supra note 5, at 255.
65. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973).
66. Id. at § 1065.84-3. A similar definition will be found in ORE. REV. STAT. § 734.510
(4)(a) (1974).
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order of liquidation is issued. 7 The Liquidation Article of the
Illinois Insurance Code does indicate that the rights of policy-
holders and others "shall be fixed as of the date of the entry...
unless otherwise provided by order of the court." 8 Thus, it ap-
pears that for post-insolvency guaranty fund coverage to continue
the court issuing the liquidation order would have to extend the
date for the fixing of the rights and liabilities of policyholders and
this extension would have to be found sufficient to satisfy the "in
force" test of the Guaranty Fund Act. This in fact is the proce-
dure which is currently being followed in Illinois. 9
While this indirect process of establishing that policies remain
in force for purposes of the Guaranty Fund Act is not necessarily
objectionable, it does make temporary post-insolvency protection
contingent upon the content of the order of liquidation. If the
order of liquidation did not provide for a thirty day continuation
of coverage, it would be difficult to show that the Illinois guaranty
fund was obligated to provide post-insolvency coverage. In con-
trast, the NAIC Model Bill provides that during that thirty day
period the Guaranty Fund Association "be deemed the insurer to
the extent of its obligation on covered claims. . ... 0 Moreover,
the NAIC Model Bill only requires that a covered claim arise out
of and be within the coverage of the insurance policy.' However,
both of these NAIC provisions were changed in Illinois. In Illinois
the guaranty fund is only deemed to stand in the shoes of the
insolvent company if the fund itself processes and reviews
claims." The fund has rarely chosen to do this and instead relies
upon the Illinois Bureau of Liquidations to administer claims. In
addition, as already mentioned, the "in force" test was added to
67. The Wisconsin statute differs with Illinois in this regard, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 645.
43 (Special Supp., 1975).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 806 (1973).
69. For example, the petition for an order of the cancellation of the policies of the
LaSalle Insurance Company requested that all policies be cancelled "except with respect
to covered claims under the Illinois guaranty fund .. " The final order adopted this
language. In re LaSalle Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 71CH4744 (Cook Cty. Ill. Jan. 3, 1972).
70. Model Casualty Bill § 8 (1)(b), supra note 5, at 256.
71. "'Covered Claim' means an unpaid claim, including one for unearned premiums,
which arises out of and is within the coverage, and not in excess of the applicable limits
of an insurance policy to which this Act applies. Model Casualty Bill § 5 (3), supra
note 5, at 254.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-4 (1973).
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the definition of covered claims. Thus, in Illinois the guaranty
fund is only obligated for post-liquidation coverage if the court
order provides for it, while under the NAIC Model Bill the guar-
anty fund is responsible regardless of the content of the court
order.
It was originally believed by the authors that the differences
between the NAIC Model Bill and the Illinois guaranty fund were
of little practical consequence. However, recently in Missouri a
court issued an order of liquidation that did not specify that the
covered policies should remain in force.73 The guaranty fund of
Missouri is concerned because the court's action might preclude
recognition of its post-insolvency claims in liquidation. While
such a situation might be of some concern to insurance compa-
nies, it is important to note that policyholders of the insolvent
Missouri company would nevertheless be protected because the
Missouri liquidation and guaranty fund provisions are not inter-
dependent on the question of thirty day post-liquidation cover-
age. The guaranty fund is obligated to policyholders regardless of
the status of the claims it will present in liquidation. On the other
hand, the omission of a post-insolvency extension of coverage in
Illinois would affect both the policyholders of the insolvent com-
pany and the obligation of the Illinois guaranty fund. This result
is undesirable. Policyholders should be entitled to at least thirty
days of post-insolvency coverage and this coverage should not be
dependent on the skill of the judge issuing the order of liquida-
tion.
CEILINGS ON GUARANTY FUND COVERAGE
Even more objectionable than the inclusion of deductible
provisions in most guaranty funds has been the inclusion of
limitations on the amount of coverage which is provided.74
These per policy claim limitations range from $50,0007 to
73. NCIGF Letter, Oct. 7, 1975, at 2.
74. As of Jan. 1,1975 no upper limits, other than policy limits, are imposed on the
liability of the funds in Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-508 (a) (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403a (4),(5) (1971);
IDAHO CODE § 41-3608 (a) (Supp., 1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973) amended
by P.A. 79-1011 (Sept. 17, 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-6-8-7 (i) (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. §
304.36-080 (a) (Supp., 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:13 (1) (a) (Supp., 1975); ME. REV.
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$1,000,000.76 A substantial number of states have adopted the
ceiling of $300,000 recommended by the NAIC. 7
In those states which impose a ceiling the drafters apparently
ignored the fact that an insurance policy
is not an ordinary mercantile contract, but one of great public
importance. In the usual case, if a policyholder loses a premium,
he is not seriously harmed, but if a loss goes unpaid, or even
unpaid in a substantial measure, great harm is likely to be
done.7 1
Large claims consequently deserve full reimbursement because
they are the very claims which the policyholder was most anxious
to insure against. It is unreasonable to declare that the guaranty
fund should only protect individuals or average losses.79 If a per-
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4438 (1) (A) (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.785 (4)(1)(a) (Supp.,
1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-28-4 (D)(2) (Supp., 1973); TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.28-C, § 5
(2) (Supp., 1974).
76. N.Y. INS. LAW. § 334 (2) (McKinney Supp., 1974).
77. ALASKA STAT. § 21.80.060 (a)(1) (Supp., 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-278 (1)
(a) (Supp., 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4208 (a) (1) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 631.57
(1)(a)(3) (1972); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 431 D-8 (a) (1) (Supp., 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515
B.5 (1)(a) (Supp., 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN § 40-2906 (a)(1) (Supp., 1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 175 D, § 5 (1)(a) (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60C.09 (2) (Supp., 1975); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 83-23-115 (1) (a) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-5708 (1)(a) (Supp., 1974);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 687A.060 (1)(a) (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404-B:8 (I)(a) (Supp.,
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58.155.48(a)(1) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-36-08 (1)(a)
(Supp., 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 734.570 (1)(c) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1701.201
(b)(i) (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-825 (1)(a) (Supp., 1974); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§ 58-29A-16 (Supp., 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-40-8 (1)(a) (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 3615 (a) (1) (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-763 (1)(a) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.32.060 (1)(a) (Supp., 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-26-8 (1)(a) (1972).
78. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 645.68 (3), Comment (Special Supp., 1975).
79. Commissioner Lorne R. Worthington, in his testimony before Congress on behalf of
the NAIC regarding the NAIC Model Guaranty Bill said:
We have included in our model bill provision for paying back to the policyhold-
ers on a deductible basis all claims in excess of $100, including unearned prem-
ium [sic] as well as the claims they might have as an [sic] result of losses.
We have placed a limitation of $300 [sic] on any claim in order to avoid having
the association paying out large claims which would go to people who would not
be hurt as significantly as the average person would, because the thrust of our
bill is to protect the average person, to provide them with immediate payment
as though the company was not insolvent and to provide a payment whereby
the public can maintain its confidence in the insurance industry.
Hearings on S. 2236 Before the Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-
45, at 150 (1970) (statement of Lorne R. Worthington, Commissioner of Insurance for the
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son or corporation is willing in good faith to pay a premium to
trade uncertainty for certainty, such risk aversion is important
and should be protected.
The ludicrousness of attempting to place limits on the coverage
of guaranty funds once the general concept has been accepted was
recently evinced in Illinois. An official of the Illinois Department
of Insurance suggested that the Department would only support
a bill to increase the ceiling on the Illinois guaranty fund"0 if the
proposed limit was reduced from $300,000 to $100,000. The pro-
fessed reason for such a request was that a major writer of hospi-
tal malpractice insurance was experiencing financial difficulty
and therefore the proposed increase would potentially subject
other insurers to larger assessments. It is undoubtedly of little
comfort to those hospitals which had coverage with the shaky
insurer to know that the Illinois Department of Insurance was
more concerned with minimizing the guaranty fund assessments
which might have been made on a large group of solvent compa-
nies than it was with reducing the disastrous effect a large mal-
practice judgment could have on an "uninsured" hospital and,
perhaps, the general level of health care in the hospital's locality.
When the primary problem was the insolvency of automobile
insurers, a $100,000 or $300,000 limit may have been reasonable,
if not rational. This was true because most automobile policies
which were sold contained coverages which were less than most
guaranty fund ceilings. However, with the escalation of claim
settlements and the threat of insolvencies in many other lines of
insurance, this is no longer the case. In short, because it is impos-
sible to predict what types of risks and losses will be the subject
of an insolvency there seems to be little justification for ceilings
or other restrictions in guaranty fund legislation except to placate
the shortsighted attitude of some members of the insurance in-
dustry.8
State of Iowa). Also note efforts to restrict coverage on the basis of the claimant's net
wealth. 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 284 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403 (a) (f) (b) (1970);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-34-3 (5) (Supp., 1974).
80. The ceiling has recently been raised to $100,000. P. A. No. 79-1011 (Sept. 17, 1975),
amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-2 (1973). See note 40, supra.
81. The authors do not deny that liquidity problems may arise if there is no ceiling on
guaranty fund laws, but these problems are best handled by means other than establishing
limits on the coverage of guaranty funds. It is better to spread the risk of insolvency rather
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RECOVERY FOR "ECONOMIC" Loss 2
At least three states, Indiana, 3 Nebraska,84 and Missouri, 5 spe-
cifically limit recovery from their respective guaranty funds to
economic loss in the case of a bodily injury claim. In effect, these
states declare that the nonpecuniary costs of an accident will be
borne by the policyholders or third parties who might otherwise
have been compensated by insurance.
While the merits of awarding damages for nonpecuniary losses
can be, and have been, extensively debated," any statutory limi-
tation on nonpecuniary losses should apply to all injured parties,
not just those who happen to be insured by or seek compensation
from an insolvent insurer. If nonpecuniary losses are recognized
as determinable in cases not involving the insureds of insolvent
insurers, distinguishing between regular insurance claims and
guaranty fund claims once the guaranty fund concept is adopted
is inequitable." The policyholder is entitled to the full protection
of his policy.8 As in the case of deductibles, limiting recovery to
economic losses capriciously places an extra burden of insolvency
on those who are least likely to be able to bear it.
SUBROGATION
Subrogation has long been a unique and elusive part of insur-
than have a few policyholders bear the burden, and adopt other means of resolving liquid-
ity problems. For example, more flexible approaches to funding can minimize the "dom-
ino effect" of an insolvency on other insurers. Moreover, it should be noted that property-
liability guaranty fund assessments may already be deferred in rare cases. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 73, § 1065.87-6 (1973). See discussion in note 149, infra.
82. For purposes of this section, economic loss is used to indicate the pecuniary losses
suffered by a policyholder or injured third party. The term economic loss has received wide
currency as a means of describing the losses compensable under a no-fault reparations
system. The authors feel the term should represent all costs, not just pecuniary ones,
associated with an accident. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3, 82 (1973).
83. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-6-8-7 (1) (1975).
84. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2406 (3) (Supp., 1972).
85. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.785 (4)(1)(a)(b) (Supp., 1975); H.B. 562, 89th Tenn. Gen. Ass.
(April 16, 1975).
86. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 215-25 (1970); R. POSNER, supra note
82, at 3.
87. Neither Indiana, Nebraska, nor Missouri have enacted a no-fault provision limiting
nonpecuniary claims.
88. The policyholder may still be subject to claims for general damages in such a case.
See text accompanying notes 89-105 infra.
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ance law.89 With regard to insolvency, a more than sufficient de-
scription was provided by Professor Oscar R. Goodman when he
said "that this whole problem of subrogation of insurance compa-
nies against consumers is a can of worms. ... I"
When the insurance industry was proposing the uninsured mo-
torist endorsement as a solution to the insolvency problem, spe-
cific recognition was taken of the abuses which can occur when
an insurance company retains the option to sue the "insured" of
an insolvent insurer rather than pursue the claim in liquidation."
Consequently, many statutes were amended to prohibit subroga-
tion in such cases. 2 It is noteworthy that this action was neces-
sary despite the statements of insurance industry spokesmen that
subrogation Was a problem of little consequence." Surprisingly,
despite the well-known problems of subrogation in liquidation
proceedings, the NAIC Model Guaranty Association Bill merely
excluded subrogated claims from its scope without comment. 4
This provision has engendered anomalous results.
For example, an injured party (Valerie Victim) has a cause of
action against the insured (Ralph Reckless) of an insolvent in-
surer (Belly Up Insurance Company) and Valerie Victim also has
first party coverage for such a loss with her own insurer (Merciless
Insurance Company). Valerie Victim would appear to have the
option of seeking compensation from either her own insurer,
Ralph Reckless, the liquidator of Belly Up Insurance Company,
or the Illinois guaranty fund. 5 If Valerie Victim sought compen-
89. See generally KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE TEXT 147-68 (1971); Kimball & Davis, The
Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1962).
90. 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8955 (testimony of Oscar R. Goodman, Professor of
Finance, Roosevelt University).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1973); cf. id. § 821(3).
92. See id. at § 755a. See also 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 680 (1969).
93. Hearings on S. 2236, supra note 25, at 69. Nevertheless, the characterization of the
insured as being worse off with mandatory uninsured motorist coverage was apparently
true in some cases. If subrogation were permitted, an insurer with the wherewithal to
pursue the claim, instead of an individual policyholder, would be the real party in interest
in any litigation. See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 8955 (testimony of Oscar R.
Goodman, Professor of Finance, Roosevelt University).
94. Model Casualty Bill § 5(3), supra note 5, at 253.
95. However, the Illinois guaranty fund requires that any claimant who has a claim
against his own insurance company which is also a covered claim shall exhaust his rights
under his own policy before seeking compensation from the fund. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 1065.96 (1973). See also Model Casualty Bill § 11 (2), supra note 5, at 260.
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sation from either Ralph Reckless or the Illinois guaranty fund,
the claim would be treated as a covered claim,9" subject of course
to applicable limits and deductibles. However, if instead Valerie
Victim sought compensation from her own insurer,97 Merciless,
who then elected to pursue the subrogated claim of Valerie Vic-
tim by suing Ralph Reckless, the results would be quite different.
A subrogated insurer's claim cannot be treated as a covered claim
under the NAIC Model Bill 8 or the Illinois guaranty fund9 be-
cause of the exclusion of all subrogated claims. Therefore, the
subrogated insurer, Merciless, can only pursue the claim against
the liquidator of the Belly Up Insurance Company or the "in-
sured" of the insolvent insurer, Ralph Reckless.
Naturally, the claim will only be pursued by Merciless against
the insured policyholder if the policyholder has sufficient assets
in his own right to satisfy the claim. Unfortunately, even if Ralph
Reckless does satisfy the claim of Merciless, his only source of
compensation is the liquidator of the Belly Up Insurance Com-
pany. This occurs because the exclusion from coverage in both the
NAIC Model and the Illinois Guaranty Fund Act applies to all
subrogated claims regardless of who satisfies them. Thus, if an
"insured" compensates an injured party directly, or the injured
party makes a direct claim against the guaranty fund, the claim
is deemed a covered claim.'"" However, if the same claim is made
by, or paid to, a subrogated insurer, it is not treated as a covered
claim and the "insured" policyholder suffers.1"'
There is no valid reason to distinguish between subrogated
claims and other insurance claims within the context of guaranty
fund laws. Just as in the case of claims deductibles and ceilings,
provisions prohibiting coverage for subrogated claims prevent the
spreading of the cost of an insolvency. Although a provision to
96. Despite the provision that Valerie Victim must first pursue her claim against her
own insurer, her claim nevertheless falls within the definition of covered claim in Illinois.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.84-3(b)(ii) (1973). In contrast, once the subrogated insurer
presents the claim, it no longer falls within the definition. See also Model Casualty Bill §
5 (3)(b), supra note 5, at 254.
97. As is required by the Illinois guaranty fund, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.96 (1973).
98. Model Casualty Bill § 5 (3) (b), supra note 5, at 254.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 § 1065.84-3(b)(ii) (1973).
100. Id.; Model Casualty Bill § 5 (3)(b).
101. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
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prohibit subrogation in such cases would also protect insureds,102
it may be that this is not the best solution. If subrogated recover-
ies are permitted, the cost of an insolvency would be spread
among companies in relation to their premium writings. If subro-
gated recoveries are prohibited, the spreading of the cost of an
insolvency will depend on the incidence of accidents between the
policyholders of solvent carriers and those of the insolvent in-
surer. Moreover, one commentator has stated that the removal of
subrogation privileges might even have serious consequences for
small insurers."3 Whether this would be true is uncertain; the
point is that the present treatment of subrogated claims under
guaranty fund laws inadequately protects policyholders. 10 There-
fore, to eliminate some of the problems of subrogation and at the
same time achieve adequate loss spreading, it is recommended
that the claims of subrogated insurers be recognized as covered
claims within guaranty fund laws.105
NO-FAULT COVERAGE
The current Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund Law applies to
almost all casualty, fire, and surety coverages. °" However, be-
cause a substantial portion of the coverages provided under most
of the no-fault bills proposed in Illinois to date would be catego-
rized as being within Class 2(a),117 it appears that the enactment
102. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 755(a)(3) (1973); and H.B. 1710, 79th Ill. Gen. Assem-
bly (1975) (Introduced April 10, 1975).
103. D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 36.
104. Arizona has acted by prohibiting subrogation by insurers. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20-668 (A) (Supp., 1974). The NCIGF has also recognized the problem. NCIGF Letter,
April 30, 1973, at 4. However, the formal proposal to prohibit subrogation was only re-
cently submitted to the NAIC. See 2 Proceedings of the NAIC (unpublished draft 1975).
105. See H.B. 1713, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1975) (Introduced April 10, 1975).
106. [The guaranty fund] applies to all kinds of direct insurance written under
Class 2 and Class 3 of Section 4 of the "Illinois Insurance Code" except that it
shall not apply to accident and health insurance written under clause (a) of
Class 2 or to marine insurance other than inland marine, written under clause
(d) of Class 3 of Section 4 of this Code.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.83 (1973).
107. Class 2(a) insurance is "Insurance against bodily injury, disablement or death by
accident and against disablement resulting from sickness or old age and every insurance
appertaining thereto." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 616 (Class 2(a)) (1973). Essentially it is
accident and health insurance sold by casualty insurers. Class 2(b) may cover some, but
not all, no-fault coverages. Class 2(b) applies to "any loss or liability resulting from or
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of a no-fault bill without either a corresponding amendment to
the Guaranty Fund Law or the enactment of a life, accident and
health insurance guaranty fund law would effectively eliminate
a great portion of the coverage of a no-fault law from the scope
of the Illinois guaranty fund. This is because the Guaranty Fund
Law presently excludes insurance provided under the authority
of Class 2(a). 08
Although the Illinois regulatory process has been much im-
proved in many ways since the days when the failure of high risk
automobile insurers prompted the enactment of the original guar-
anty fund law, there seems very little reason to exclude from the
Guaranty Fund Law benefits due from automobile insurers just
because the automobile reparations system has been modified.
Such a change has no discernable positive impact on the financial
condition of insurance companies. In fact, to the extent an
automobile insurer might have little prior experience with no-
fault coverages, the risk of an insolvency may even increase.
Thus, in the absence of more expansive guaranty fund legislation,
any no-fault automobile insurance bill should be accompanied by
an appropriate amendment to the Illinois Guaranty Fund Law
which would maintain the solvency protection presently afforded
to all purchasers of automobile insurance in Illinois.
LIFE GUARANTY FUNDS
It seems manifest that policyholders desire the security of
knowing that an insurer's obligation will be performed regardless
of the type of policy, yet efforts to have a life, accident and health
insurance guaranty fund bill enacted in Illinois have been contin-
ually frustrated.0 9 Such a bill would expand the coverage of guar-
incident to the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle . Id. 616 (Class 2(b)).
However, the section is further delimited as follows:
Any policy insuring against loss or liability on account of the injury or death of
any person may contain a provision for payment of disability . . . , and death
benefits . . . , irrespective of legal liability of the insured, ... and such provi-
sion shall not be deemed accident insurance.
Id. (emphasis added). While the relationship of Class 2(a) to Class 2(b) is less than clear,
it is submitted that no-fault medical coverages, except those specifically coming within
the exception of Class 2(b), are authorized under Class 2(a).
108. Id. § 1065.83 (1973).
109. See H.B. 150, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Jan. 30, 1973); H.B. 838,
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anty funds to protect almost all insurance policyholders in Illi-
nois. While insolvencies among life insurers are much less fre-
quent than in the property-casualty lines, they are not un-
known."10 The potentiality for insolvency in the life insurance
business was recently re-emphasized in a dramatic manner by the
Equity Funding scandal." Nevertheless, the life insurance indus-
try does not believe that a life insurance guaranty fund supported
by the life insurance policyholders is desirable."'
There are two primary objections made by the life insurance
industry to the enactment of life guaranty fund legislation. First,
even in those rare cases where life insurers are found to be im-
paired or insolvent, there is usually no permanent loss to policy-
holders"3 because life policies can be continued through the use
of such measures as policy liens,"4 moratoriums,"' merger, and
reinsurance." 6 Second, the life insurance industry has paraded
the familiar argument that guaranty funds are undesirable be-
cause the policyholders of well-managed companies will be subsi-
dizing the mismanaged companies."'
78th I1. Gen. Assembly (1973) (Introduced Mar. 28, 1973); H.B. 1735, 79th Ill. Gen.
Assembly (1975) (Introduced April 10, 1975).
110. For example, Federal Old Line Insurance Company was placed in liquidation in
the State of Washington on December 14, 1971. Assessments of $2.6 million were made
against the life guaranty fund members of that state. NCIGF Letter, April 26, 1972, at 5.
See also Heins, Liquidation of Insurance Companies, Part B, supra note 2, at 245-51;
Illinois Official Warns of 20 Life Insurers' Financial Problems, Wall Street Journal, Sept.
18, 1970, at 4, col. 2.
111. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, No. 142, Multi-Dist. Litigation
(Cent. Dist. Cal., filed June 1, 1973). An extremely brief review of the Equity Funding
insolvency can be found in the 1973 Ill. Dep't Ins. Ann. Rep. 33.
112. See generally 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 157-206 (1971). The American Life Insur-
ance Ass'n will only support a life guaranty fund bill if it includes a tax offset provision.
See text accompanying notes 119-36 infra.
113. 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 175 (1971). See also 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 564-93
(1969), for a study of the losses suffered by life insurance policyholders.
114. Under a lien plan, the policies continue in force, but reductions in the cash value
are made. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 804(3) (1973).
115. A moratorium prevents policyholders from exercising a contractual right. It most
often applies to policy loans which may be made against the cash value of a policy. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 804(3) (1973).
116. In liquidation, the life insurance policies may be purchased by another company.
In Illinois the power to reinsure creates a preference in liquidation for policyholders.
However, the preference is contingent upon another company being willing to assume the
policies. Id. § 805(4).
117. See generally 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 174-206 (1971).
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Neither of these arguments is persuasive. If there is usually no
loss associated with the insolvency of a life insurance company,
then it surely is not asking too much of the life insurance industry
to formally guarantee such security. On the other hand, if losses
are possible, the policyholders of life insurance companies should
be protected. With regard to the subsidization issue, the life in-
surance industry, like the casualty industry before it, has not
explained why it is better to have a limited number of policyhold-
ers bear the cost of an insolvency rather than spread such costs
among all life or health policyholders. Moreover, if regulators and
insurance experts cannot predict insolvencies easily and accu-
rately, it makes little sense to suggest that uninformed policy-
holders can do so."'
TAX OFFSET PROVISIONS
In addition to the two previously mentioned objections to life
guaranty fund legislation, the life insurance industry has been
effectively demanding that life guaranty fund legislation include
a tax offset provision. The tax offset provision has been advanced
by the industry as the only reasonable means of preventing dis-
crimination between old and new life policyholders under a post-
insolvency assessment procedure."9 The discrimination is said to
arise because life insurance premiums are fixed and hence only
new policyholders will bear the cost of an insolvency.
While this may be true as of the enactment date of a guaranty
fund law, the continued sales of life insurance policies will mean
that in the long run most policies will have been sold with knowl-
edge of the potential guaranty fund liability. Furthermore, the
discrimination thesis assumes that only new policies will shoulder
any insolvency assessment. However, because whole life insur-
ance contracts involve long-term risks, companies build margins
for contingencies into their pricing structure to allow for unantici-
pated eventualities. It would seem that a guaranty fund assess-
118. Cf. A. Mayerson, Ensuring the Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance
Companies in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POICY 149 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg
eds. 1969). See also Denenberg, Is "A-Plus" Really a Passing Grade? 34 J. RISK & INS.
371-84 (1967).
119. 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 205 (1971).
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ment is no different than any other unpredictable expense; conse-
quently, it is not borne just by new policyholders. Finally, and
perhaps most telling, if life insurance insolvencies have cost indi-
vidual policyholders little or nothing in the past, can it be argued
in good faith that there is substantial discrimination in establish-
ing a means whereby all life policies will benefit from insolvency
protection in return for permitting an insignificant or nonexistant
cost to be spread among all solvent life insurance companies.
Nevertheless, of the sixteen states which have enacted some form
of life guaranty fund,'10 ten have included a tax offset provision.",
Upon close inspection the use of a tax offset provision does not
appear desirable. To understand this, a brief description of life
insurance taxation is necessary. In Illinois no insurance premium
taxes are levied on domestic companies; domestic companies only
pay a tax on income to the state. 2  Furthermore, because of the
effect of retaliatory insurance statutes, 23 the two percent prem-
ium tax levied on foreign (out-of-state) companies is treated as
an excess tax. For example, if one company owed $2,000 in insur-
ance premium tax before consideration of the Illinois income tax
and had a $1,200 income tax obligation, the Illinois premium tax
payable would only be $800 so that the company's total obligation
120. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-301 to 318 (Supp., 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-
3001 et seq. (Supp., 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 520-537 (1972); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-5801 et seq. (Supp., 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 44, §§ 2701-10 (Supp., 1975);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 686C.010 et seq. (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 404- D: 1-18 (Supp.,
1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-32-1 et seq. (Supp., 1975); N.Y. INS. CODE § 224 (McKinney
1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-155.65-.83 (1975); ORE. LAWS ch. 251 (Advance Sheet, 1975);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-561 to 579 (Supp., 1974); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-D (Supp.,
1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 4151-69 (Supp., 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
48.32A.010-.930 (Supp., 1974). Puerto Rico has also enacted such a provision. P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 26, ch. 39, §§ 3902-3918 (Supp., 1975).
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-309(i) (Supp., 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3016
(Supp., 1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-5817 (Supp., 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 44,
§§ 2701-20 (Supp., 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 686C.280 (1973); ORE. LAWS ch. 251, § 14
(Advance Sheet, 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-577 (Supp., 1974); TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.28-
E, § 15 (Supp., 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4167 (Supp., 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48.32A.100 (Supp., 1974).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1021(1973).
123. Id. § 1056. Retaliatory premium tax statutes are designed to encourage similar
treatment for a state's domestic insurers when they do business out-of-state. For example,
if Indiana taxed Illinois companies at a 6% rate, Illinois would tax Indiana companies
doing business in Illinois 6%, but all other companies would still pay the 2% tax. The
provision creates an incentive for Indiana not to unreasonably tax Illinois companies.
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for premium and income taxes would be $2,000. In other words,
the Illinois premium tax on foreign insurance companies is only
levied to the extent that the total of the income tax on Illinois
business plus the premium tax actually levied is equivalent to a
two percent premium tax. Thus, a large part of the Illinois two
percent premium tax on out-of-state insurers really is an Illinois
income tax obligation.
Companies currently treat guaranty fund assessments as busi-
ness expenses for federal income tax purposes. More importantly,
because the Illinois income tax is based on federal adjusted gross
income,' 5 the end result is that even without a premium tax offset
a guaranty fund assessment made against either a foreign or do-
mestic company is deducted from federal, and hence, state, taxa-
ble income.
Viewed in this light, the issue of whether to include a premium
tax offset in a guaranty fund bill involves deciding whether the
burden of an insolvency is better shared by the federal govern-
ment' 6 and the policyholders of all solvent insurance companies
doing buisness in the state or, in the alternative, having the tax-
payers of the State of Illinois bear the entire burden of such an
insolvency. The authors believe it is far better to internalize some
of the costs of an insolvency among all similar types of policyhold-
ers through assessments and have the federal government absorb
the remainder of the cost of an insolvency through income tax
deductions rather than have Illinois taxpayers exclusively bear
the cost of an insolvency. At the very least, in the former case
those policyholders who are eligible for insolvency protection will
make a direct contribution for it.'
The use of a tax offset provision is even more objectionable
when analyzed in conjunction with the provisions of the Model
Life and Health Guaranty Association Act proposed by the
NAIC.'25 In fact, an NAIC type bill which includes a tax offset
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 1-102, 2-203(b)(2) (1973).
125. Id. § 2-203 (a)(1).
126. The State of Illinois would of course also bear some of the burden since its income
tax is based on the federal income tax. However, because the Illinois corporation tax rate
is only 4%, the Illinois tax loss is negligible. Id. § 201(b)(2).
127. It should be noted that the same reasoning is applicable to any type of insurance
guaranty fund tax offset provision.
128. Model Life Bill, supra note 36.
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provision might be anathema to legislators because the taxpayers
of the domiciliary state of the insolvent insurer will be required
to subsidize not only their own resident policyholders, but also
the policyholders of the insolvent company throughout the coun-
try. This undesirable result occurs because the NAIC Model Life
and Health Guaranty Association Bill assumes that the life poli-
cies of the insolvent insurer will be reinsured as a unit. Thus,
section 8 of that bill makes the Guaranty Association of the domi-
ciliary state of the insolvent insurer responsible for all the policies
of the insolvent insurer.'29 This was done in order to avoid the
problem of determining the deficiency applicable in each state to
the policies issued by the insolvent insurer and to facilitate rein-
surance of the policies.'30 While this approach is understandable,
it is not appropriate when co-joined with a tax offset provision.
For example, imagine two states: A and B. Assume that one
hundred percent of the life insurance sold in state A is issued by
companies domiciled in state B which has adopted the NAIC
Model Act with a tax offset provision. Furthermore, assume that
all of the insurance in state B is sold by state B insurers. Under
the NAIC Model with a tax offset provision, all of the life insur-
ance policyholders in state A would have guaranty fund protec-
tion paid for by the taxpayers of state B. This occurs because
state B assumes responsibility for guaranteeing all of the policies
issued by state B insurers, including those of state A residents.
Of course, the cost of such protection reduces the tax revenues of
state B whenever a guaranty fund assessment is made.
If instead, no tax offset provision is included in the guaranty
fund of state B, the results are quite different. The guaranty fund
of state B still protects the policyholders of both state A and state
B. However, when an insolvency occurs in a state B company, the
burden of the assessments will be passed onto the policyholders
of state B companies instead of state B taxpayers. Because many
129. Id. § 8, at 163. Compare the property-casualty funds which apply only to residents
or risks located in the state. See, e.g., Model Casualty Bill § 3, supra note 5, at 253; and
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73 § 1065.84-3 (b) (1973). But see Harrison, supra note 34, at 524.
130. It should be noted that the Wisconsin law, which was enacted before the NAIC
model was drafted, does contemplate that the Wisconsin Insurance Security Fund will
only bear the cost of preserving Wisconsin policies in liquidation. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
646.01, 646.11 (Special Supp., 1975).
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policyholders of solvent state B companies reside in state A, state
A policyholders are less likely to escape bearing their fair share
of the cost of a life company insolvency despite the fact that the
guaranty fund of a single state initially assumes the full burden
of the insolvency.' 3'
In short, the surprising result of not including a tax offset provi-
sion within a life guaranty fund is to reduce the tax loss of one
state while simultaneously achieving the goal of guaranty funds:
spreading the cost of an insolvency among all similar policyhold-
ers. 1
32
AN ALTERNATIVE REASON TO REJECT TAX OFFSETS
Although insurance companies will ultimately pass the cost of
insolvency assessments on to their policyholders, it should be
noted that because of the threat of guaranty fund assessments
each insurance company initially has an immediate interest in
the well-being of all other insurance companies. A similar concern
with the solvency of all other members of the insurance industry
does not exist when the cost of an insolvency is only borne by the
policyholders of an insolvent company or when the cost of an
insolvency is shifted onto a state's taxpayers through a tax offset
provision.
Allegations that the regulators of a state will be more vigilant
if a tax offset provision is enacted seem unsound.1 3 Regulators,
as political creatures, are probably much more responsive to indi-
vidual losses than they are to impersonal losses suffered by the
state treasury. The uncompensated insureds of an insolvent in-
surer have a specific issue with which to challenge the compe-
131. The NAIC Model Life Bill contemplates assessing member companies on the basis
of both the amount of business they write in each state and the premium volume .of the
insolvent insurer in each state. Model Life Bill § 9 (8), Comment, supra note 36, at 168.
132. The spreading will not be perfect by any means. With regard to any particular non-
domiciliary state, it is unlikely that all companies doing business in the non-domiciliary
state will also be members of the guaranty fund in the domiciliary state. It is also unlikely
that the policyholders of solvent state B companies will be distributed in exactly the same
manner that the policyholders of the insurer were. Despite such imperfections, it appears
far more reasonable and equitable to spread the cost of an insolvency among the policy-
holders of all companies doing business in the domiciliary state than to have the cost borne
solely by the taxpayers of the domiciliary state.
133. Krogh, INSURER POSTINSOLVENcy GUARANTY FUNDS 54, supra note 48.
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tence and tenure of a regulator in the media or by other means;
it is unlikely that the effect on state revenues of a tax offset
provision would engender a similar regulatory response. Never-
theless, the sensitivity of regulators to public outcry has not pre-
vented insurance company insolvencies.
The omission of a tax offset provision from guaranty fund legis-
lation offers a much more promising means of encouraging regula-
tory action against insolvencies. Insurance companies are by far
the greatest source of expertise regarding the solvency and man-
agement of other insurance companies. Moreover, the transmis-
sion and evaluation of information regarding other insurers is
made easier by the well-organized nature of the insurance indus-
try. Not only are there five active company trade associations,134
but the property-casualty industry has also established a national
clearing house for information on guaranty funds.'35 In addition,
the communication of information about the financial condition
of other insurers is already statutorily protected under the Model
Guaranty Fund Laws. Perhaps most importantly, it is the insur-
ance industry rather than policyholders which often has the
greatest influence on regulators. 3 ' Thus, it must be concluded
that better, not worse, solvency regulation will result from the
adoption of post-insolvency guaranty funds which do not include
tax offset provisions.
THE LIQUIDITY PROBLEM
Recently, the insolvency of the Gateway Insurance Company
has made property and casualty insurers more fully aware of their
liabilities under guaranty fund laws.'37 This concern was
prompted by the realization that a guaranty fund is usually obli-
gated for the total amount of the claims of the policyholders of
the insolvent insurer, not just the difference between the claims
134. The American Insurance Association (New York), the American Mutual Insurance
Alliance (Chicago), and the National Association of Independent Insurers (Des Plaines,
Illinois) represent a substantial portion of the companies selling property and casualty
insurance. The Health Insurance Association of America (Chicago) represents health and
disability insurers and the American Life Insurance Association (Washington D.C.) repre-
sents life insurers.
135. See discussion in note 33, supra.
136. K. ORREN, CORPORATE POWER & SOCIAL CHANGE 41-48 (1974).
137. See, e.g., Korsan, supra note 34, at 8.
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and the assets of the insolvent insurer.' 8 This of course was the
intent of the original legislation: to shift the full cost of insol-
vency, including delay, from the innocent "insureds" of the
insolvent company to a larger group, the policyholders of solvent
companies.'39 However, because the law makes property and cas-
ualty insurance companies subject to initial assessments which
are much larger than any ultimate deficiency, the insurance in-
dustry has been seeking ways to minimize the assessments which
companies must actually pay.
Among the proposals submitted for consideration are: "quick
take" provisions; priority in liquidation provisions; policyholder
security deposits accounts; tax offsets for assessments; the crea-
tion of special insolvency reserves; and special deposit assess-
ments. All these proposals are designed to limit the amount of
assessments which will be made upon the members of a guaranty
fund if a company becomes insolvent. This objective is not unrea-
sonable as long as the protection afforded policyholders is not
diminished. However, it appears that at least some of these pro-
posals militate against the protection of the policyholder in the
absence of complete guaranty fund coverage.
For example, the Illinois guaranty fund is assigned the rights
of any person receiving a recovery from the fund."' Such assigned
claims have the same priority in liquidation as the covered claims
of the individuals would have had."' As a result in states which
have deductible provisions, or where policyholders have claims
which are in excess of the guaranty fund ceiling, the guaranty
fund and the "insured" policyholders who have not been made
whole because of the gaps in guaranty fund coverage will be com-
peting at the same level of priority in liquidation for whatever
assets remain after the liquidator's expenses and higher priority
items are paid."'
It is likely that the guaranty fund, because it has been assigned
138. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.84-3 (1973); Model Casualty Bill § 5 (3), supra
note 5, at 254.
139. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 646.01, Comment (Special Supp., 1975).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.95 (1973).
141. Id. § 1065.92.
142. But see NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2410 (4) (Supp., 1972), which deems the payment of
covered claims to be expenses of the liquidator.
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the rights to the covered claims it has paid, will present a total
claim in liquidation substantially larger than the total of the
claims of policyholders or third parties whose claims in whole or
in part were not covered by the guaranty fund. Claims in liquida-
tion in Illinois generally share on a dollar for dollar basis.'
Hence, the bulk of any recovery which occurs in liquidation will
not go to those who have suffered uncompensated injuries be-
cause of gaps in guaranty fund coverage. Instead, the remaining
assets will for the most part be used to pay the claims assigned
to the guaranty fund and thereby reduce the net assessments
levied upon solvent insurance companies.' Such a result is unde-
sirable. Those individual policyholders who have uncompensated
claims should receive priority in liquidation over guaranty fund
claims if the guaranty fund has been structured to preclude com-
plete recovery of losses. Of course, it should be emphasized that
the use of priority provisions in liquidation is not necessary to
protect policyholders if complete guaranty fund coverage is pro-
vided within the context of a guaranty fund law. Priority provi-
sions may nevertheless be desirable in liquidation to facilitate
rescue operations by the liquidator or the guaranty fund,' or to
distinguish guaranty fund claims from those of other creditors.
143. People v. Marquette Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 267 Ill.App. 478 (1st Dist. 1932).
144. Because most policyholder claims except for the deductible will be assigned to the
guaranty fund, an overwhelming portion of the "policyholder" claims presented in liqui-
dation will really be the claims of solvent insurers. Thus, in dividing whatever assets
remain in liquidation, policyholders who have suffered because of gaps in guaranty fund
coverage are unlikely to be fully compensated. Cf. 1973 Wis. INS. DEP'T, SPECIAL DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT ON MARKET MENS MUTUAL INS. Co. 135-36, where it is stated:
From the figures developed it is apparent that the elimination of the small
claims would have an insignificant impact on the amounts realized by those
having larger claims. From the administrative point of view, the processing of
the small claims would have to be done regardless of whether they are to be
denied ultimately.
The debilitating effects of disproportionately large "policyholder" claims presented by
the guaranty fund on real policyholder claims is magnified when the guaranty fund is also
given priority in liquidation. See S.B. 1108, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1975) (Introduced
April 11, 1975); and, NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2410 (1973). Although guaranty fund expenses
and claims may deserve some priority in liquidation, they should be subordinated to the
claims of policyholders or third parties who have actually suffered as a result of an insol-
vency.
145. If the guaranty fund has a specified priority in liquidation, its efforts to reinsure
or otherwise mitigate losses should be less subject to third party challenge.
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However, they should only be adopted in conjunction with provi-
sions eliminating deductibles and ceilings for loss claims.
In addition to suggesting that guaranty funds receive a priority
in the distribution of assets, " 6 several industry spokesmen have
advocated various other means by which liquidity problems asso-
ciated with property-casualty guaranty funds can be minimized.
These proposals sometimes involve suggestions for a pre-funded
insolvency fund.' Pre-funding has been advocated because it
ensures that even those companies which become insolvent will
have made a contribution to the fund. More importantly, it is
suggested that pre-funding will minimize the disruptive effects
associated with post-insolvency assessments. However, neither of
these arguments is forceful. As has been previously mentioned,
properly circumscribed deductibles on unearned premiums can
serve as an adequate substitute for pre-funding for purposes of
assessing policyholders of the insolvent insurance company for
the cost of guaranty fund protection.' It also appears that the
assessment provisions of guaranty fund statutes can be modified
to minimize the disruptive effects of post-insolvency assess-
ments."9 Moreover, traditionally the insurance industry has op-
posed pre-funded guaranty funds for a very practical reason: the
ravenous appetite of state legislatures for revenue has often re-
sulted in the diversion of guaranty fund monies for other pur-
poses."50
In response to this problem two modified pre-funding mecha-
146. See Statement of Kenneth Nails on behalf of the AMIA to the NAIC Sub-
Committee on Guaranty Funds, 2 Proceedings of the NAIC (1975).
147. See, e.g., Korsan, supra note 34, at 8.
148. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
149. Those advocating pre-funding believe it is better to impose a yearly predictable
charge rather than to be intermittently subject to a charge of 1% (Illinois) or 2% (NAIC
Model). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.87-6 (1973); Model Casualty Bill § 8 (1)(c), supra
note 5, at 256. It is the authors' opinion that the sources of revenue for assessments need
not be as narrow as at present. While it may be important that the ultimate cost of an
insolvency be internalized to the appropriate lines of insurance, this does not preclude
other companies or segments of the industry from making loans to the guaranty fund so
that assessments will not create a severe liquidity crisis in a particular company or line
of business. Compare Model Life Bill § 9(4), supra note 36, at 167 which permits deferral
of assessments, with the relatively limited deferral provisions of Model Casualty Bill §
8(1)(c), supra note 5, at 256. In addition, pre-funding may constitute only a temporary
advantage. See Harrison, supra note 34, at 522.
150. See NCIGF Letter, June 25, 1975, at 4.
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nisms have been suggested. One is the creation of an autonomous
national guaranty fund corporation. 5' The primary attraction of
this proposal is that it would place pre-insolvency assessments
outside the grasp of state legislatures. However, because such a
proposal might require the corporation to obtain a national
charter, the states, and insurance companies which advocate con-
tinued regulation by the several states, would be put in the
somewhat anomalous position of requesting federal intervention
to enhance state regulation.
As an alternative, the creation of special insolvency reserves
has been suggested. Although the Accounting Principles Board
has eliminated the use of catastrophic reserves,'52 it is felt that the
creation of special surplus insolvency funds remains a possibility.
Such a fund is already required in Ohio.'53 However, such a fund
remains in the complete control of a company and requires only
a bookkeeping entry for its creation. There is no guarantee that
bona fide assets will actually underlay the surplus account.54 For
these reasons, the Ohio provision appears to be an illusory means
of pre-funding.
A much more promising proposal is the Policyholder Security
Deposit Account advocated by the State Farm Insurance Com-
pany.'55 Although the label is somewhat of a misnomer because
the proposal does not provide complete insolvency protection to
policyholders and is instead primarily intended to minimize the
liability of the guaranty fund by creating a pool of assets which
should be availabe upon an insolvency, the proposal has merit.
The Policyholder Security Deposit Account is established with
151. For a detailed description of this proposal, see 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 685-90
(1969).
152. The National Underwriter (Property-Casualty ed., April 18, 1975) at 1, col. 3.
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3955.11 (Page 1971).
154. Cf., D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 74-77.
155. 2 Proceedings of the NAIC (1975). State Farm has advocated this proposal for
several years. See 1 Proceedings of the NAIC 293 (1970); and, 2 Proceedings of the NAIC
319-35 (1971). State Farm would not support guaranty fund legislation in Illinois that did
not include a provision for a Policyholder Security Deposit Account. The guaranty fund
legislation enacted in Illinois was amended to include such a provision. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 73, §§ 767.9, 767.16 (1973). Also see the cogent speech of Thomas C. Morrill, Vice
President, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on Property-Liability
Insurers and Guaranty Funds before the College of Insurance, 2 Proceedings of the NAIC
(1975).
[Vol. 25:227
INSURANCE GUARANTY FUNDS
an independent custodian. The amount of marketable securities
deposited with the custodian must be no less than seventy-five
percent of the gross premiums written for the prior year.'56 In
order to minimize the expense of maintaining custodial accounts,
the custodian's duties are deemed to not be those of a trustee. The
insurance company retains complete authority to transfer assets
into and out of the account and receive earnings and dividends
on the assets in the account.'57 The responsibility for determining
that the assets placed with the custodian comply with the law
falls on the Director of Insurance. 5 ' Nevertheless, the State Farm
proposal is far superior to other proposals because it creates a pool
of assets before an insolvency is imminent and segregates these
assets from the company's regular assets. Moreover, because the
Department of Insurance is provided with monthly reports on
security transactions within the account, monitoring is facili-
tated.
Alternative provisions already existing in other state laws are
not as effective. For example, the Texas Asset Protection Act'59
requires every insurer to maintain unencumbered assets equal to
its reserve liabilities. While the Texas Act does make any transfer
in violation of this provision subject to the superior lien of
"claimants,"'' ° no other means of policing this provision is pro-
vided. Moreover, the section does not preclude the manipulation
of reserve liabilities.'
A related Kansas statute permits the Insurance Commissioner
to require deposits to be made equal to reserves or premiums on
Kansas insurance business, after a hearing and a determination
156. The most recent State Farm proposal suggests that the account contain the greater
of: (a) the sum of reserves for losses due and unpaid; reserves for losses incurred but
unreported; reserves for loss adjustment expense and reserves for unearned premiums; or
(b) 75% of gross premiums written for the prior year. 2 Proceedings of the NAIC (1975).
Because reserves are subject to manipulation the requirement that 75% of gross premiums
be deposited in marketable securities is the key provision. Cf., D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES
AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 110-16.
157. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 767.14 (1973).
158. Id. at § 767.12. The latest proposal by State Farm requires monthly reports of
transactions in the account to be sent to the commissioner of insurance in addition to
yearly examinations. 2 Proceedings of the NAIC (1975).
159. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.39-A, § 5 (Supp., 1975).
160. Id.
161. See D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIES AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note 2, at 74-77.
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that the continued operation of a company may be hazardous to
Kansas policyholders.' This provision is faulty because it is only
applicable after an insurer is in financial difficulties; it is not a
preventive remedy. Therefore, the State Farm proposal appears
to be the most reasonable proposal submitted by the insurance
industry for minimizing the cost of an insolvency which will be
shifted onto the members of a guaranty fund.163
BLUE CROSS/BLUE SHIELD
Although Blue Cross and Blue Shield' sell a substantial por-
tion of the health insurance in the United States, 5 these organi-
zations were not included in the NAIC Model Life and Health
Insurance Guaranty Association Act.' 6 This omission is inexcus-
able.
Despite the fact that well-reasoned arguments have been made
for not including Blue Cross within the framework of a guaranty
fund, "'67 the fundamental fact remains that a substantial number
of persons rely on the health insurance provided by Blue Cross.
These persons deserve no less protection than other insureds. The
counter-argument has been made that Blue Cross benefits are
guaranteed by the contracts negotiated between the providers of
162. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-222b (1972).
163. Small companies may object to the cap of $40,000,000 on the size of the Policy-
holder Security Deposit Account suggested by State Farm. However, it can be supported
on at least two grounds; first, insolvencies have historically occurred most frequently
among small companies; and second, small companies may be subject to more risk be-
cause they insure smaller numbers of persons and hence their results may display a wider
degree of variation. Cf., D. OLSON, INSOLVENCIEs AMONG AUTOMOBILE INSURERS, supra note
2, at 36-37.
164. Hereinafter referred to as Blue Cross unless otherwise specified.
165. It is estimated that about 35% of the civilian population under 65 has coverage
with Blue Cross. S. LAW, BLUE CROSS WHAT WENT WRONG? 11 (1974).
166. The Industry Advisory Committee to the Insurance Guaranty Funds (B-3) Sub-
committee of the NAIC has proposed that the scope section of the NAIC Model Life and
Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act (Model Life Bill) be amended to include a
provision that the Act may not apply to Blue Cross. 2 Proceedings of the NAIC 391 (1974).
As of October 18, 1975, only four states, Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 522(1)
(1972); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-32-3 (Supp., 1975); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 37-822(6) (Supp., 1975) (covered as a mutual fund); and Texas, TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.28-D, § 3(1) (Supp., 1974), provide guaranty fund coverage for Blue Cross
contracts.
167. N.Y. Ins. Dep't, Regulation of Financial Condition of Insurance Companies 92
(1974).
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health services and the plan. Hence, because the providers are
contractually obligated to offer services, the subscribers are said
to be fully protected.
This argument must be rejected. First, not all the benefits of
Blue Cross contracts are offered by parties who have contracted
with Blue Cross to provide such services. Second, there is no
guarantee that a provider, despite its contractual liability, will
not shortchange or even deny benefits to a subscriber of Blue
Cross if the solvency issue arises. In such a case the subscriber is
in substantially the same position as the "insured" of an insol-
vent insurer; the expected coverage will not be provided. While
it is true that the subscriber could sue the provider for services
due, this does not appear to be a reasonable alternative. In addi-
tion to the probable disparity between the financial positions of
the provider and the subscriber in any lawsuit, an individual in
need of health care is in an even more disadvantageous position;
it does not appear unreasonable to assume that individuals in ill-
health have a very inelastic demand for health care.
Third, the suggestion that a separate Blue Cross guaranty fund
be created is questionable," 8 if not fanciful. Most states have only
one Blue Cross Plan, eight states have two Blue Cross Plans, and
only four states contain more than two Blue Cross Plans within
their boundaries."6 9 Even in those states with multiple plans, the
insolvency of one Blue Cross Plan would probably severely impair
the other participating Blue Cross Plans and thereby compound
the problem of an insolvency without alleviating the harm suf-
fered by subscribers.
Admittedly, health insurers may be somewhat leery of partici-
pating in the guaranty fund with Blue Cross because the capital
and reserve requirements applied to Blue Cross may be different.
However, the very fact that Blue Cross may operate under insuffi-
cient capital and reserve requirements militates against exclud-
ing Blue Cross from guaranty fund coverage because the chance
of an insolvency may therefore be greater. It seems senseless to
exclude from the coverage of a guaranty fund the very persons
who may be most in need of guaranty fund coverage.
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Furthermore, two positive benefits may result from including
Blue Cross and Blue Shield within a guaranty fund applicable to
all accident and health insurance companies. First, health insur-
ers may encourage insurance commissioners to have Blue Cross
establish more adequate reserves, a larger surplus, or undertake
other solvency strengthening measures. Second, if a health insur-
ance company becomes insolvent, the inclusion of Blue Cross
within a health guaranty fund reduces the assessments which will
be required of each non-Blue Cross member. Therefore, it is rec-
ommended that Blue Cross and Blue Shield be included within
any health insurance guaranty fund plan.
CONCLUSION
Although guaranty fund laws offer the best means by which the
several states can ensure that persons purchasing insurance ac-
tually receive the benefits they purchase, certain imperfections
exist both in present property-casualty guaranty funds and pro-
posed life, health and accident guaranty funds. Some of these
imperfections are obvious. In those states which have enacted
property-casualty guaranty funds, the presence of deductibles
and ceilings on coverage is unwarranted. Moreover, guaranty
fund legislation must be modified to prevent subrogated insurers
from making claims against the insureds of insolvent insurers.
Also, in many states guaranty fund coverage has not been
extended to life, health and accident insurance policies. It i's the
authors' conclusion that Illinois and other states should amend
their guaranty fund laws to eliminate these gaps in coverage.
However, even more complex problems must be resolved. For
instance, tax offset provisions are an unjustified means of financ-
ing guaranty funds. The use of tax offsets eliminates the direct
incentive property-casualty insurance companies now have to
actively assist the insurance commissioner in preventing
insolvencies. Concomitently, tax offset provisions also externalize
the cost of an insolvency because the group which benefits the
most from insolvency protection, policyholders, will not be di-
rectly assessed for the cost of such protection. In addition, the
sharp decline in stock portfolio values which was experienced in
1974 indicates that much more attention must be paid to the
capitalization requirements of insurance companies and the fi-
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nancing of guaranty fund laws. Lastly, and perhaps of greatest
importance, legislators and regulators should recognize the close
interplay of the liquidation and guaranty fund laws and analyze
each amendment to these laws to make sure that the protection
of the policyholder is always being adequately secured.
